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Ethanol plant investment in Canada: A structural model1 
 C.-Y. Cynthia Lin and Fujin Yi 
Most of the fuel ethanol plants in Canada were built recently and either 
use corn or wheat as feedstock. It is important to determine what factors affect 
decisions about when and where to invest in building new ethanol plants and 
which feedstock is chosen as feedstock. In this paper we model the decision to 
invest in ethanol plants using a structural model of a dynamic game. We find 
that competition between plants is enough to deter local investments, the 
availability of feedstock is important in determining plant location, and the 
effects of policy support for wheat-based plants are significant. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There are several governmental policies in Canada designed to promote the development 
and use of renewable fuels such as ethanol.  In May 2008, the Canadian government 
passed Bill C-33, which enabled it to establish a national renewable fuels mandate for the 
gasoline pool by 2010. A Notice of Intent in 2006 was published in the Canada Gazette 
Part I on December 30, 2006, which set an objective of mandating an average 5% 
renewable fuel content based on the gasoline volume. Based on the trend of net sales of 
gasoline used for road motor vehicles between 2005 and 2008, a federal mandate of 5% 
renewable fuel content would require a minimum production of 1.9 billion liters of fuel 
ethanol. The actual production of fuel ethanol in 2009, however, was only 1.348 billion 
liters (GAIN, 2010). Before that there have been several federal programs that promote a 
domestic renewable fuel industry, including the EcoEnergy for Biofuels Overview and 
the Agri-Opportunities Program. In addition, provincial incentive programs designed to 
encourage the development of a Canadian renewable fuels industry have also been 
introduced; for instance, Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario provide an extra tax 
exemption for fuel ethanol production, and Saskatchewan and Manitoba set a higher 
blending mandate than the federal goal.  
 
Canada’s ethanol production capacity reached 1.135 billion liters by the end of 2008, a 
significant jump from the around 700 million liters production capacity in 2007 (GAIN, 
2008). This surge in ethanol production suggests that the government support policies 
may have played a role in stimulating the development of fuel ethanol industry in Canada, 
although this has not been proven. A rigorous analysis of the effect of policy on ethanol 
investment should also control for the effects of other factors such as fuel ethanol prices, 
feedstock markets, incumbents’ behavior, etc. Understanding the different effects of 
policy, economic and strategic factors on ethanol investment could help the government 
to design policies to develop this new industry in Canada.   
 
Previous papers have attempted to address the decision of investing an ethanol plant in a 
static framework using U.S. data. Lambert et al. (2008) use a probit regression model 
along with spatial clustering methods to analyze investment activity of ethanol plants at 
the county level for the lower U.S. 48 states from 2000 to 2007. Five categories of factors 
determine the location of ethanol plant: infrastructure, product and input markets, fiscal 
attributes of local communities, and state and federal incentives. However, this analysis 
does not model the influence of existing ethanol plants on potential entrants.  
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Sarmiento and Wilson (2007) uses logistic regression with U.S. data to analyze the 
impacts from the agricultural characteristics of a county, competition, and state-level 
subsidies. The competition between existing ethanol plants and entrants are expressed by 
the distance.  Their results conclude that existence of a competing ethanol plant reduces 
the likelihood of making a positive location decision and this impact decreases with 
distance.  
 
The above empirical papers did not adequately capture the dynamic impacts of the factors 
that affect ethanol investment. Substantively, the dynamics may be more realistic and, 
hence, may provide a better description of behavior. More importantly, there may be 
patterns in the data that are simply not captured by a static model. Hence, ignoring the 
dynamics could potentially generate misleading conclusions about behavior (Dubé al., 
2005). The two cross sectional models miss an important dimension of the investment 
decision: time. Investors not only choose whether to invest in ethanol plants but also 
choose when to enter the fuel ethanol industry. Their goal is to maximize the present 
discounted value of the entire stream of profits. Expectations about exogenous conditions 
such as factors affecting the input market and government policies will affect when and 
where ethanol plants will be built.   
 
Schmit et al. (2010) consider the influence of policies on U.S. corn-based fuel ethanol 
investment decisions. A potential fuel ethanol investor’s decision is determined by 
revenue and cost, two factors which are evolving over time with other covariates. 
According to the results, the current fuel ethanol industry expansion was induced by the 
revenue-enhancing effects of policy and, in the absence of these policies, much of the 
recent expansionary periods would have not existed. Due to limitations of their model, 
however, their study does not analyze the strategic interactions between ethanol plants. 
Schmit et al. (2010) allow the incumbents to exit if it is not profitable to produce fuel 
ethanol, however, due to the scarcity of exit observations for fuel ethanol plants in 
Canada, it is impossible to empirically recover the exit policy function. Our paper 
therefore focuses on the entry decision. 
 
Lin and Thome (2010) use U.S. data to analyze which factors impact and how the 
incumbent ethanol plants influence the new entrants’ investment decision under a 
dynamic framework. Their research indicates that availability of inputs is important in 
determining expected profits from investment in an ethanol plant and competition 
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between plants is enough to deter local investment. However, the econometric model they 
used required them to discretize all the continuous state variables so that some important 
information may have been lost when the variables were binned. In addition, their model 
can only handle a binary investment decision, so cannot be used for analyzing the ethanol 
investment decision in Canada, where there are multiple feedstocks are available.  In 
particular, Lin and Thome’s (2010) analysis of the U.S. ethanol industry focused only on 
corn ethanol, since 95% of the ethanol in the U.S. is produced from corn, while our 
analysis of Canada examines both corn- and wheat-based ethanol plants.  
 
Lin and Yi (2011) estimate a structural econometric model of the European fuel ethanol 
industry with 4 different feedstock choices: barley, corn, sugarbeet, and wheat. They 
found that fuel ethanol plants in Europe are so dependent on government support policies 
that several market factors such as ethanol prices are not significantly important. Lin and 
Yi (2011) assert that the investment of fuel ethanol plant should be analyzed in a dynamic 
game framework with the consideration of strategic decisions. They consider and define 
two different interaction effects: a competition effect and an agglomeration effect. The 
former effect arises when there are multiple ethanol plants located in one region if these 
plants compete in feedstock supply when they choose the same feedstock or compete in 
local fuel ethanol market given limited demand. The latter effect arises when there are 
several ethanol plants located in the same region if the local government invests in 
improving the infrastructure such as water supply, roads, etc. to support the ethanol 
industry development, or if there exists transportation and marketing infrastructure and 
educated work force developed by the existing plant. Lin and Yi (2011) emphasize that 
the competition effect usually deters ethanol plant investment, while the agglomeration 
effect induces an ethanol plant to locate near other plants. According to their results, the 
competition effect among European fuel ethanol plants outweighs the agglomeration 
effect.  
 
This paper builds on the structural econometric models of Bajari et al. (2009) and Lin and 
Yi (2011). Based on the background of Canada fuel ethanol industry including the recent 
sharp increase and the interactions among plants, it is interesting to ask what factors 
recently affect the decision to invest in ethanol plants in Canada, and how ethanol plant 
location decisions are made. The estimation results are also able to show the differences 
between the European and Canadian fuel ethanol industries.  
 
Our results show that fuel ethanol investment in Canada is quite different from the 
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industry in Europe. First, government policy effects vary across fuel ethanol plants that 
are based on different feedstocks. Wheat-based plants are significantly affected by the 
policy, while the effect to plants using corn as feedstock is not obvious. Second, the 
interactions between potential entrants cannot be ignored in the Canadian fuel ethanol 
industry. If a potential entrant considers that there are many potential competitors, their 
investment might be deterred. However, these interactions are not significant in Europe. 
 
The paper proceeds as followings.  The structural econometric model of the dynamic 
game is described in Section 2. The results from the empirical estimation will be 
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Structural model for ethanol plant investment 
 
2.1 Dynamic game model  
Structural models of dynamic games are useful tools whenever strategic interactions are 
an important aspect of individual behavior. In the ethanol market, because a firm’s costs 
and market demand hinge on the structure of market, a firm’s decision depends on its 
conjecture about competitors’ behavior. This type of model assumes agents are forward 
looking and maximize the expected discounted value of the entire stream of payoffs. 
Agents are assumed to make decisions based only on historic information directly related 
to current payoffs, and history only influences current decisions insofar as it impacts a 
state variable that summarize the direct influence of the past on current payoffs.  
 
The estimation of structural models of dynamic games are under the principle of revealed 
preference using individual’s choices (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010).  Recently, semi-
parametric methods have been used to estimate structural parameters (Pesendorfer and 
Schmidt-Dengler, 2003; Pakes et al., 2007; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). Bajari and 
Hong (2006), Bajari et al. (2007) and Bajari et al. (2009) added to this literature by 
proposing methods to estimate parameters in a dynamic game with continuous state 
variables.  
 
Most of these econometric methods involve a two-step estimation procedure. The 
common logic is to use a specific equilibrium solution concept to work backward from 
the observed equilibrium action(s) to statements about unobserved profits (Reiss and 
Wolak, 2007). Research on dynamic competition has shown that computing an equilibrium 
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for even relatively simple industry models is all but prohibitive (Bajari et al., 2007). The 
econometric method employed in this paper is based on the introduction of Hotz-Miller 
inversion (Hotz and Miller, 1993), and the estimations of equilibrium are simplified to 
two steps without analytically solving the equilibrium of a dynamic game, which reduces 
the high computational burden. In this two-step estimator, the economist first flexibly 
estimates the agent’s policy functions, choice probabilities that are conditional on state 
variables and the other agents’ actions, and the transition probabilities for state variables.  
Second, structural parameters from the period profit function are estimated.  
 
Usually the first step is estimated using a nonparametric method based on discrete state 
variables. However, some state variables are naturally continuous. One could increase the 
number of grids in estimating the first stage choice probabilities to minimize the loss of 
information, but Bajari and Hong (2006) point out that the discretization has an offsetting 
effect: it increases the variance of the first step estimation. When the dimension of the 
continuous state variables is larger than four, it is not possible obtain √N  consistent 
(where N is the sample size) and asymptotically normal estimators for the second stage 
parameters through discretization. Instead of discretizing continuous variables, Bajari and 
Hong (2006) and Bajari et al. (2009) suggest that policy and value functions can be 
approximated parametrically using a combination of basis functions in which the 
nonparametric first step estimation can be implemented using continuous state variables.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical model 
Our model follows the model developed by Bajari et al. (2009) and used by Lin and Yi 
(2011). In the dynamic model of ethanol plant investment, each “market” ݉  has ܫ 
potential entrants. In the model, there are ݐ ൌ 1,⋯ ,∞ time periods. As in Aguirregabiria 
and Mira (2007), we assume that all the agents move simultaneously in each time period 
ݐ and choose stategy ܽ௜௧ from the identical choice set ሼ0,1,⋯ , ܭሽ, and that the random 
preference shocks are private information. Action ݇ ൌ 0 represents the outside option, 
which is to wait outside of the fuel ethanol market and not produce ethanol, and the rest 
of elements of numbers represent different feedstock choices available for fuel ethanol 
production. 
 
The existence of multiple equilibria is a prevalent feature in most empirical games 
because the best response functions are nonlinear in other players’ actions. Due to the 
difficulty of analytically solving for explicit multiple equilibria, we use the method 
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suggested by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991). They consider a specification in which a 
firm’s action depends on the number of firms that are operating in the market but not on 
the identity of these firms. Their assumption is that all the firms are symmetric and 
produce a homogeneous good. Then the number of equilibrium entrants is invariant over 
the multiple equilibria. Therefore, we will follow this method and use only the number of 
other plants choosing certain feedstocks, rather than the identity of the plants choosing 
certain feedstocks, to represent the strategic interactions. 
  
An investor’s time-ݐ investment timing decision is assumed to be a function of the state 
of the market ߗ௠௧ ൌ ሺݏ௠௧, 	ܽି௜௧ሻ,  a vector which  include exogenous profit-shifting state 
variables ݏ௠௧ , and the neighbor plants’ actions ܽି௜௧ . The Canadian Renewable Fuel 
Association reports that Canada had both first generation and second generation fuel 
ethanol producers by 2010. However, only 2 demonstration facilities out of 19 ethanol 
plants are producing ethanol using cellulosic biomass such as straw from wheat, barley 
and oats, and their capacities are extremely small. In 2010, it is estimated that 64% of the 
production of domestic fuel ethanol is derived from corn and 35% from wheat and 1% 
from “other” feedstock (GAIN, 2010). Therefore, our model only focuses on the first 
generation fuel ethanol plants using corn or wheat as feedstock.  ܽି௜௧ contains the number 
of existing and new ethanol plants in a given market which choose the same feedstock as 
the ethanol plant ݅ , and the number of existing and new ethanol plants that choose 
different feedstocks. Owing to the competition and agglomeration effects, each investor’s 
decision potentially depends on whether there are other plants nearby.  As a consequence, 
each investor does not solve merely a single agent dynamic programming problem, but 
rather a multi-agent dynamic game.  
 
The exogenous state variables ݏ௠௧  includes ethanol price, gasoline price, natural gas 
price, corn price, wheat price, corn production intensity, wheat production intensity, 
number of existing ethanol plants in local market, and government ethanol support 
policies such as financial incentives and blending mandates. We assume that ݏ	 is 
common knowledge to all players in the game and is observable to the econometrician. 
However, in order to identify the following model, we have to divide ݏ ൌ ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ and 
ݏି௜  are assumed not to enter into plant ݅’s mean payoffs. For instance, a wheat-based 
ethanol plant is not affected by the corn price. All the above exogenous variables except 
policies are assumed to evolve according to a first-order Markov process   ݃̅ሺݏᇱ|ݏ, ܽ௜, ܽି௜ሻ, 
where ݏ′ are the next period exogenous state variables, and summarize the direct effect of 
the past on the current environment.   
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In addition to the publicly observed state variables ߗ௠௧ , the expected profit from 
investing an ethanol plant depends on shocks that are private information to the ethanol 
plant but not observed by either other plants or by the econometrician. Let ߳௜௧ ൌ
ሺ߳௜௧ሺ0ሻ,⋯ , ߳௜௧ሺܭሻሻ denote a vector of ݅. ݅. ݀ shocks to potential plant ݅’s payoffs at time ݐ, 
and we assume the error terms are distributed extreme value and its density function is 
݂ሺ߳௜௧ሻ ൌ exp	ሺെ߳௜௧ሻexp	ሺെexp	ሺെ߳௜௧ሻሻ 
	
To reduce the notational complexity in the following sections, we drop the market 
subscript. Payoff in each time period depends on the agent’s actions, the state variables 
and random preference shocks, and has the additively separable representation: 
ݑ௜௧ሺܽ௜௧, ܽି௜௧, ݏ௧, ߳௜௧ሻ ൌ ߎ௜ሺܽ௜௧, ܽି௜௧, ݏ௧ሻ ൅ ߳௜௧ሺܽ௜௧ሻ, 
where the stochastic component is the privately observed shocks ߳௜௧ and the deterministic 
component of profit Π୧ሺܽ௜௧, ܽି௜௧, ݏ௧ሻ  is linear in the publicly observable state variables: 
ߎ௜ሺܽ௜௧, ܽି௜௧, ݏ௧ሻ ൌ ݏ௧ᇱߛ௦ ൅	ܽ௧ᇱߛ௔  . 
Therefore, the development payoff is independent of time except through the state 
variables ሺݏ௧, ܽ௧ሻ and the shock ߳௜௧.  
 
Let ߛ ൌ ሺߛ௦, ߛ௔ሻ denote the vector of the coefficients in the investing fuel ethanol plant 
profit function.  These are the parameters that we are going to estimate. The coefficients 
ߛ௦ are for the publicly observed state variables such as ethanol prices, feedstock prices, 
etc. We expect that ethanol price, local feedstock production intensity and support policy 
would have positive effects on the ethanol plant payoff. For the current technology 
natural gas is an important bio-refinery heat source, so we expect the natural gas price to 
have a negative effect on the payoff. In the meantime, feedstock price would have 
negative impacts on the payoff. However, gasoline prices have ambiguous effects 
because an increase in the gasoline price could improve the demand of fuel ethanol as a 
substitute or increase the production cost of fuel ethanol, Similarly, the effect of number 
of existing ethanol plants is also uncertain, as the existing plants could compete in the 
limited feedstock market or share existing infrastructure and educated labor. The 
coefficients ߛ௔  on the strategic variables thus measure the net effects of the 
agglomeration and competition effects, and therefore indicate whether ethanol plants 
interact strategically on net. Positive ߛ௔  would indicate that the agglomeration and 
competition effects were positive on net, and therefore that the agglomeration effect is 
dominant. Negative values would indicate that the effects were negative on net, and 
therefore that the competition effect is dominant.  
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Lin and Yi (2011) not only define the competition and agglomeration effects between 
plants’ interaction, they also argue that there are two different types of interactions based 
on different players: incumbent interaction and entrant interaction. Each potential entrant 
݅ not only observes the incumbent plants’ action, but also knows the choice probabilities 
ߪି௜  of the other potential entrants. Then the decision maker 	݅  can interact with the 
existing plants, an interaction we call the incumbent interaction; and the decision maker	݅ 
can also interact with other potential entrants given his belief about the others’ choice 
probability  ߪି௜, an interaction we call the entrant interaction. Based on Lin and Yi’s 
(2011) argument, we expect the magnitudes of the competition and agglomeration effects 
to be larger for existing incumbents rather than for new entrants that may enter at the 
same time. The reason is that the competition effect from incumbents is more negative 
because incumbents may have local market power (first-mover advantage), and the 
agglomeration effect from incumbents is more positive because the incumbent may have 
already established the infrastructure that a new plant can take advantage of. However, 
we cannot empirically distinguish these differences because our strategic variables only 
show the net effect of the competition effect and agglomeration effect. 
 
Since each potential entrant has 3 strategies (stay out of fuel ethanol market, or either 
choose corn or wheat to produce fuel ethanol), the strategic variables are grouped by the 
strategy choices and the other plants’ corresponding strategies. This setting is suggested 
by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), which can avoid multiple equilibria. The signs of 
both strategic variables could be positive or negative. For instance, if fuel ethanol plant ݅ 
chooses wheat as feedstock to produce fuel ethanol and the other new entrants also 
choose wheat, as mentioned above, then the sign is decided by the net effect of the 
competition effect and the agglomeration effect. If at least one of the other players 
chooses corn as its feedstock, then the sign of the strategic effect can still go either way. 
There may be less competition in the wheat feedstock market but the competition in the 
fuel ethanol market may still exist, especially when the fuel ethanol demand is not large 
enough at the developing phase of this industry in Canada. Moreover, the agglomeration 
effect in the ethanol market also exists although ethanol plants choose different 
feedstocks. In addition, insignificant signs for this group of strategic variables do not 
mean there is no interaction between two ethanol plants: it could result from the positive 
and negative effects exactly offsetting each other. 
 
Let ߪ௜ሺܽ௜|ݏሻ denote the probability that fuel ethanol plant ݅ choose action ܽ௜ given state 
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variable ݏ,	 and ௜ܹሺݏ, ߳௜; ߪି௜ሻ is the fuel ethanol plant ݅’s value function given state ݏ, 
private information ߳௜ and holds fixed the strategies of the other plants ߪି௜. In a Markov 
perfect equilibrium, the ethanol plant investor’s strategy ܽ௜ሺݏ, ߳௜ሻ and corresponding 
conditional choice probabilities ߪ௜ሺܽ௜|ݏሻ  are solving the following maximizing value 
function:  
௜ܹሺݏ, ߳௜; ߪି௜ሻ ൌ
																			max௔೔൛ߎ௜ሺܽ௜, ݏ; ߪି௜ሻ ൅ ߳௜ሺܽ௜ሻ 	൅
																			ߚ ׬∑ ௜ܹሺݏᇱ, ߳௜ᇱ; ߪି௜ሻ	݃̅ሺݏᇱ|ݏ, ܽ௜, ܽି௜ሻߪି௜ሺܽି௜|ݏሻ݂ሺ߳௜ᇱሻ݀߳௜ᇱ݀ݏ′	௔ష೔ ൟ		
where the term ߎ௜ሺܽ௜, ݏሻ ൅ ߳௜ሺܽ௜ሻ is the current period payoff if the plant chooses  ܽ௜	. 
The rest part captures the discounted future utility, and it integrates over ߳௜ᇱ   and  ݏ′, 
where the ethanol plant investor has to take into account the next period shock ߳௜ᇱ and 
observed state variables sᇱ. For the structural estimation, we set the discount factor β to 
0.9. 
 
Then, we can define a choice specific value function ௜ܸሺܽ௜, ݏሻ as 
௜ܸሺܽ௜, ݏሻ ൌ 
																	ߎ௜ሺܽ௜, ݏ; ߪି௜ሻ ൅ ߚ ׬∑ ௜ܹሺݏᇱ, ߳௜ᇱ; ߪି௜ሻ	݃̅ሺݏᇱ|ݏ, ܽ௜, ܽି௜ሻߪି௜ሺܽି௜|ݏሻ݂ሺ߳௜ᇱሻ݀߳௜ᇱ݀ݏᇱ௔ష೔   
which is interpreted as the returns excluding ߳௜ሺܽ௜ሻ  when the ethanol plant chooses 
current strategy ܽ௜  and all the future period strategies and payoffs adjust. Then, we can 
define the ex ante value function as: 
௜ܸሺݏሻ ൌ ׬ ௜ܹሺݏ, ߳௜; ߪି௜ሻ݂ሺ߳௜ሻ݀߳௜. 
The ex ante value function is the expected value of ௜ܹ in the future given that current 
state is ݏ . Therefore, we can rewrite the choice specific value function through the 
following equation: 
௜ܸሺܽ௜, ݏሻ ൌ ߎ௜ሺܽ௜, ݏሻ ൅ ߚܧሾ ௜ܸሺݏᇱሻ|ݏ, ܽ௜ሿ. 
At last, we can derive the equilibrium probabilities using the choice specific value 
function using the following equation: 
ߪ௜ሺܽ௜|ݏሻ ൌ 	 ୣ୶୮	ሺ௏೔ሺ௔೔,			௦ሻሻ∑ ୣ୶୮	ሺ௏೔ሺ௔೔ᇲ,			௦ሻሻೌ೔ᇲ
. 
2. 3 Econometric estimation  
Our goal is to use the Canadian data to estimate the mean utility parameters  ߛො  in 
ߎ௜ሺܽ௜, ܽି௜, ݏሻ . The econometric estimation technique we use follows the method 
developed by Bajari et al. (2009) and applied by Lin and Yi (2011).  First, we estimate 
the choice probabilities  σෝ௜ሺ݇|ݏሻ  flexibly using a sieve logit, where the sieve logit 
estimator is simply the standard multinomial logit where the covariates are selected basis 
functions, and a sieve of polynomial spaces are selected.  The estimation is based on 
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pooled data from all the markets, therefore we have to assume that the data are generated 
by a single Markov perfect equilibrium profile ો which is a stronger assumption (Bajari 
et al., 2007). Second, we apply the Hotz-Miller inversion to compute  ෠ܸ௜ሺ݇, ݏሻ െ ෠ܸ௜ሺ0, ݏሻ. 
Then, we can estimate ߎ෡௜ሺܽ௜, ݏ௠௧ሻ, the static choice specific value function given that the 
action is ܽ௜ and the state is ݏ௠௧. All these estimation steps are nonparametric and do not 
impose ad hoc functional form restrictions. Fourth, semiparametric estimators  ߛො are the 
solutions to the following minimization problem:  
ߛො௜,௔ ൌ argmin௽೔ሺ௔೔,௔ష೔,௦೔ሻ ∑ ∑ ߎ෡௜ሺܽ௜, ݏ௠௧ሻ െ ∑ ߪොି௜ሺܽି௜|ݏ௠௧ሻ௔ష೔௧்ୀଵெ௠ୀଵ ߗ௠௧ᇱ ߛ௜,௔	. 
As the common result in semiparametric estimation,  ߛො converges to the true value at a 
rate proportational to the square root of the sample size and has a normal asymptotic 
distribution (Bajari et al., 2009).  
 
Standard errors are formed by a nonparametric bootstrap. Markets are randomly drawn 
from the data set with replacement to generate 100 independent panels of size equal to 
the actual sample size. The structural econometric model is run on each of the new panels. 
The standard error is then formed by taking the standard deviation of the estimates from 
each of the random samples. 
 
 
3. Data and results 
 
3.1 Data 
Canada has 10 provinces and 3 territories. The 3 territories are not appropriate for 
agricultural production due to their extreme climate. Hence, we only use data from the 10 
provinces. Each province is divided into several Census Agricultural Regions (CAR) and 
each of them is assumed to be a separate market. We assume that in each market there are 
3 potential fuel ethanol plants that may potentially enter the market. Table 1 shows the 
average area for the CAR for every province.  
 
The panel spans the years 2001 to 2007. There are 12 ethanol plants in total in Canada, of 
which 5 fuel ethanol plants were built before 2001.  The earliest plant started to produce 
ethanol in 1981 and is located in Manitoba province. Of the 12 plants, 5 ethanol plants 
use corn as a feedstock and 7 plants use wheat. Therefore, the ethanol plants have three 
strategies, i.e., ܽ௜ ∈ ሼoutside	option, corn, wheatሽ.  
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The state variables were chosen based on considerations of state space and data 
availability. In this study, our estimation does not rely on the discreteness of the state 
space which is particular achieved by using an estimation approach that does not need 
preliminary estimation of the continuation values of the players (Bajari et al., 2009), i.e., 
we can keep the continuous state variable as they are.  
  
 
 
Province
Number of
markets
Number of
ethanol plants
Average area
for each
market(km2)
Alberta 8 1(1) 80006
Ontario 5 4(2) 179033
Manitoba 12 2(1) 46031
Quebec 14 1 94277
Saskatchewan 20 4(1) 29414
British Columbia 8 0 120639
New Brunswick 4 0 17690
Prince Edward Is 3 0 1895
Newfoundland 3 0 123498
Nova Scotia 5 0 10583
Total 82 12(5) 23064
Table 1.  Ethanol plants description
Note: Number of ethanol plants built before 2001 is in parentheses.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Ethanol Price ($/ton) 720.000 63.975 640.000 850.000
Natural Gas Price (¢/m3) 27.676 7.244 8.590 44.860
Gasoline Price ($/liter) 0.868 0.117 0.665 1.053
Corn Price ($/ton) 117.734 22.895 90.010 184.810
Wheat Price ($/ton) 128.087 39.471 67.277 253.440
Corn Intensity (000ton/km2) 0.007 0.027 0 0.229
Wheat Intensity (000ton/km2) 0.014 0.018 0 0.077
Cattle Density (head/km2) 8.990 9.326 0.015 45.651
Hog Density (head/km2) 14.015 28.378 0.007 164.476
Chicken Density (000head/km2) 0.433 0.912 0.000 4.598
Financial Support* 0.120 0.325 0 1
Blending Mandate* 0.078 0.269 0 1
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Notes:  * represents binary variables
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The first exogenous state variable is the ethanol price for every market ݉ at time ݐ , 
however, the ethanol prices are not available for each specific region. For this reason, we 
have to assume that regional ethanol price is equal to the national price. According to the 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) data, Canada is a net fuel ethanol importer, 
hence we are using the import ethanol price from the Global Information, Inc.  
 
The second state variable is the natural gas price. We are using provincial industrial 
natural gas prices from the Statistics Canada (SC), and each CAR’s natural gas price is 
equal to the provincial price.  
 
The third state variable is the gasoline price.  Gasoline prices are not available either for 
each agricultural region or for each province. However, SC provides yearly wholesale 
prices for selected cities. To determine the province-level gasoline prices we compute the 
average gasoline prices over all the cities in one province and use it to represent the 
provincial prices. For each province for which there are no city prices available, we use 
national gasoline prices for all the agricultural regions in the province.  
 
The fourth type of state variable is feedstock information. Two sets of agricultural 
information for census agricultural regions are available from the corresponding 
provincial government including production intensities and livestock densities. In the 
meantime we have to set CAR corn and wheat prices equal to corresponding provincial 
prices if they are available. However, several provinces do not produce wheat or corn 
such as Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, and we set those provincial feedstock 
prices equal to national prices.  
 
The fifth type of state variable is support policies of government, which are from Canada 
Bio-fuel annual report (GAIN, 2008). There are 2 different types of support policies: 
financial support policies including tax exemption and incentive programs, and blending 
mandates. The most common policy, a direct subsidy, is not included because the federal 
payment starts from 2008 but our panel ends in 2007. Financial support includes the tax 
credit and direct funding support from local government. Blending quota represents the 
exact percentage mandate that the gasoline should contain ethanol. All these policies are 
shown in table 3 and vary across the provinces. In addition, some provinces such as 
Saskatchewan have gone forward and implemented provincial mandates on the amount of 
ethanol required in the gasoline pool before the federal government committed to a 
mandate. Hence, the starting dates of the support or mandate are designated as the earliest 
14 
 
time between federal and provincial policies.  
 
 
3.2 Results 
In the estimation, we have three groups of covariates: the constant term for plant ݅’s 
action; interactions between state variables and specific choice variables; and strategic 
variables. Due to the 3 strategies (outside option, either chooses corn or wheat to produce 
fuel ethanol), the strategic variables are grouped by the strategy choices and the other 
plants’ corresponding strategies:  the number of the other plants who choose the same 
strategy as ݅ or not.   
 
Table 4. Estimation results of profit function 
 
 
Province Percentage of
Ethanol Mandate
Tax Exemption or Incentive
Program Duration
Alberta 5%*  2007-2011
British Columbia 5%                     2010-
Saskatchewan 7.5% 2008-2012
Manitoba 8.5% 2010-2012
Ontario 5% 2007-2017
Quebec 5%** 2006-2018
New Brunswick 5%***       -
Notes: (1) Data are from GAIN report, 2010. (2)*Target by 2011; **
Target by 2012; ***Co-operation with federal government
Table 3. Current Bioethanol Standards by Province
Coefficients Standarderror Coefficients
Standard
error
Constant Constant -728.44*** 71.40 22.37 54.57
Ethanol price 96.35 56.64 142.68*** 43.17
Natural gas price -581.48*** 28.04 -1115.02*** 13.07
Gasoline price 111.89 72.51 462.75*** 54.27
Feedstock price -454.30*** 11.21 -838.51*** 9.33
Feedstock intensity 1153.87*** 1.25 876.80*** 0.55
Cattle density 191.61*** 5.03 -728.09*** 4.78
Hog density -3.13** 1.47 -197.94*** 1.44
Chicken density 74.39*** 2.11 73.10*** 0.15
Financial support 40.94 47.16 93.85** 32.82
Blending quota 39.94 32.28 161.35*** 22.23
# ethanol plants that already exist using the same feedstock 812.15*** 12.29 -287.32*** 11.76
# ethanol plants that already exist using the different feedstock -80.00*** 17.12 -100.00*** 21.36
# of new plants choosing same feedstock this year -648.24*** 32.75 -226.97*** 22.34
# of new plants choosing different feedstock this year -192.71*** 28.83 -106.67*** 25.39
Notes: Standard errors in parentness. Significance code: *5% level, **1% level, ***0.1% level.
Corn Wheat
Explanatory Variables
State
variables
Strategic
variables
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Table 4 presents the model results. All the covariates have expected signs. The ethanol 
price does have positive effect on the fuel ethanol plant’s profit although it is not 
significant for the corn-based fuel ethanol plant. As an input, natural gas has a negative 
effect on the profit that is significant at 0.1% level for both corn and wheat ethanol plants. 
Gasoline price has a significant positive effect on wheat-based fuel ethanol plants but 
does not have a significant effect on corn-based plants. This suggests that for wheat-
based plants, the positive effect of gasoline price on profits due to the complementary 
nature of gasoline and ethanol when blended in fuel outweighs the negative effect of 
gasoline price on profits due to its use as an input. 
 
Feedstock costs are the largest component of the cost of ethanol production. As expected, 
region-level feedstock price and feedstock production intensity have significant negative 
and positive effects on the profit, respectively. All of them are significant at 0.1% level.  
 
There are interesting results governing the relationships between ethanol plants and 
livestocks. For corn-based fuel ethanol plants Table 4 shows that hogs compete with 
ethanol plants in the feedstock market and the competition effects dominate the positive 
effect that the waste product can feed hogs, while the effects from the density of cattle 
and chicken have opposite affects. The competition effect dominates for cattle and hog 
for wheat-based plants.  
 
As expected, all policies have positive effects on ethanol plant profits although they are 
not significant for corn-based plants.  
 
The interaction effects from incumbents are different from those from new entrants.  The 
existence of incumbents lowers the profits for wheat-based plants. In the meantime, corn-
based plants benefit if the incumbent plants also choose corn but their profits are lower if 
the incumbents choose wheat. These results are a little unexpected, however, it is still 
interpretable from the infrastructure and labor education: the new entrant could free ride 
off the infrastructure and human capital investments of the incumbents if the incumbents 
are using the same production technology. On the other hand, the effects of other 
potential entrant plants’ choices have significant negative effects on plant ݅’s profit. If 
plant ݅ chooses corn and wheat, then, regardless of which feedstock will be chosen by the 
other potential entrants, potential entrants would always harm potential plant ݅’s profit.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper constructs a dynamic game model for Canadian fuel ethanol plants that 
incorporates the effects of interactions between two fuel ethanol plants’ investment 
decisions in the same local market. Structural parameters measuring the effect of profit 
shifters are estimated semi-parametrically.  
 
According to our results, a potential investor considers various exogenous conditions: 
higher ethanol prices, gasoline prices and plenty of feedstocks increase profits, typically 
for wheat-based plants, while a high natural gas price and feedstock prices decrease 
profits. Government support helps improve wheat-based ethanol plant’s profit but does 
not have significant effects on corn-based plants. Livestock effects differ based on 
feedstock choices. The corn- or wheat-based fuel ethanol plant operator should consider 
the net negative effect which arises when the other plants also plan to use corn or wheat 
as well. The net negative effect of strategic interactions may partially offset the positive 
effects of government financial support policies.   
 
Obtaining local fuel ethanol price is the subject of ongoing research, and we hope in 
future work to incorporate the local data into our analysis. Our use of national rather than 
local price data may explain why some fuel ethanol price and gasoline price variables are 
not significant. 
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